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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, N.A., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
This is a case arising under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code contesting the validity of a charge back made 
by an intermediary bank on the account of a depositing 
bank after oral notice of dishonor, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial before the Court, the District Judge, 
Case No. 
13852 
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The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., entered Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment for 
the defendant. The Court found that the plaintiff re-
ceived oral notice of dishonor and that oral notice was 
sufficient notification under Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 70A-4-212 (1968). 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent prays that the judgments and orders 
of the low court be affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On or about August 18, 1970, Bernard M. Tan-
ner and Kent Lundquist executed a check in the amount 
of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) 
payable to DataCap International, Inc. and drawn on 
the Guarantee Bank and Trust Company of Chicago. 
The check was endorsed by Tanner for DataCap and 
deposited in the DataCap account in Valley Bank and 
Trust Company (hereinafter "Valley Bank"). Valley 
Bank thus became the depository bank within the mean-
ing of Section 70A-4-105(a). Valley Bank credited the 
$4,500.00 to the account of DataCap on August 18, 
1970. 
Valley Bank then forwarded the check to First Se-
curity Bank of Utah, N.A. (hereinafter "First Secur-
ity") for collection. First Security thus became an in-
termediary bank within the meaning of Section 70A-
4-105(b). 
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First Security made a provisional credit on the ac-
count of Valley Bank and Trust Company and for-
warded the check for collection to Guarantee Bank and 
Trust Company, which thus became the payor bank 
within the meaning of Section 70A-4-105(d). 
The payor bank returned the item to First Secur-
ity on or about August 27, 1970, because the check re-
quired another signature. Valley Bank thereafter 
received the original and contacted its customers. After 
obtaining the necessary signature, the item was rede-
posited in DataCap's account at Valley Bank on August 
27, 1970, and the item was forwarded through First 
Security to the payor bank in Chicago. 
First Security was notified on September 8, 1970 
that the item was being returned for insufficient funds. 
The item was mailed by the Chicago bank to First Se-
curity, but the item was lost in the mails and was never 
returned to First Security or Valley Bank. 
On September 9, 1970, First Security gave oral 
notice of dishonor to Valley Bank. First Security there-
upon reversed the provisional credit given Valley Bank. 
A R G U M E N T 
T H E U T A H U N I F O R M COMMERCIAL 
CODE E X P R E S S L Y A L L O W S A COLLECT-
I N G BANK TO G I V E ORAL N O T I C E O F 
D I S H O N O R . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
First Security, acting as a collecting bank, assumes 
several statutory obligations. Utah Code Annotated 
§ 70A-4-202 (1968) provides: 
"A collecting bank must use reasonable care 
in (a) presenting an item or sending in for 
presentment; and (b) sending notice of dis-
honor • • ." 
Section 70A-3-508 of the Code defines notice of dis-
honor: 
"(1) Notice of dishonor may be given to any 
person who may be liable on the instrument. . . 
(3) notice may be given in any reasonable 
manner. It may be oral or written, and in any 
terms which identify the instrument and state 
that it has been dishonored. A misdescription 
which does not mislead the party notified does 
not vitiate the notice. Sending the instrument 
bearing a stamp, ticket or writing stating that 
acceptance or payment has been refused or 
sending a notice of debit with respect to the in-
strument is sufficient." [Emphasis added] 
By virtue of Section 70A-4-104(3), Section 70A-3-508 
is expressly made applicable to the provisions of Article 
"(3) The following definitions in other chap-
ters apply to this chapter: 
* # * 
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Notice of Dishonor — Section 70A-3-508" 
* * # 
Therefore, the Codes makes it clear that a collecting bank 
satisfies its obligation of reasonable care if it gives oral 
notice of dishonor to a depository bank. The Code fur-
ther provides that if the collecting bank has given such 
notice that it is not liable to prior parties. Section 70A-
4-211(2) provides: 
"If before its midnight deadline, the collect-
ing bank properly dishonors a remittance 
check or authorization . . . the collecting bank 
is not liable..." 
The trial court in this case found that First Secur-
ity gave oral notice of dishonor to Valley Bank on Sep-
tember 9, 1970, well within its midnight deadline. 
(R. 17) I t is well recognized by this Court that findings 
of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co., 
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 355 (1955). Bummell v. 
Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958). Valley 
Bank has not demonstrated or even argued that the 
findings of fact in this case are erroneous; and, conse-
quently, the trial court's finding must be sustained. 
Once oral notice of dishonor is given, First Security 
is not liable to Valley Bank in the event of dishonor, 
and it has the right to "charge back" or reverse Valley 
Bank's provisional credit. Section 70A-4-212 of the 
Code provides the right to charge back: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Right of charge-back or refund. — (1) If 
a collecting bank has made provisional settle-
ment . . . and itself fails . . . to receive settle-
ment for the item , . . the bank may revoke the 
settlement given by it, charge back the amount 
of any credit given for the item . . . whether or 
not it is able to return the items if by its mid-
night deadline or within a longer reasonable 
time after it learns the facts it returns the item 
or sends notification of the facts . . " (Empha-
sis added). 
The "fact" in this case requiring notification is that 
the item was dishonored by the payor bank for insuffi-
cient funds. In other words, First Security must "send" 
Valley Bank "notice of dishonor" before midnight of the 
next business day following the receipt of notice from 
the payor. This requirement was strictly complied with. 
Section 3-508, expressly made applicable to Article 
IV, provides that such notice may be either oral or 
written. Since oral notice was given by First Security, it 
has the right at any time thereafter to charge back the 
provisional credit given to Valley Bank. The fact that 
the original was never returned became irrelevant, be-
cause Valley Bank had the right, upon receipt of oral 
notice from First Security, to enter a charge back 
against the account of its customer, DataCap. 
The facts contained in the record amply support 
the court's findings concerning notice and also comply 
with the statutory requirements outlined above. The 
clerk for First Security, Carla Manning, testified that 
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notice was given by telephone to a clerk at Valley Bank 
(R. 47). Her testimony was supported by the memo-
randum of such calls maintained by First Security in its 
course of business (Exhibit 6-D). Witnesses for Valley 
Bank could not deny receipt of such oral notice. Con-
sequently, Valley Bank was clearly placed on notice by 
such call that the check had been dishonored and that 
it must take appropriate steps to deal with its customer, 
DataCap, for collection or charge back. 
Valley Bank argues that no right of charge back 
exists because First Security did not properly dishonor 
the item and submits that written notice is required. In 
support of that argument, Valley Bank relies on Sec-
tion 70A-4-212(2) which provides: 
" (2) Within the time and manner prescribed in 
this Section and § 70A-4-301, an intermediary 
. . . bank . . . may return an unpaid item di-
rectly to the depository bank . . . 
Valley Bank then refers to Section 70A-4-301 which 
provides that: 
". . . the payor bank may revoke the settle-
ment and recover any payment, if before it has 
made final payment and before its midnight 
deadline it (a) returns the item or (b) sends 
written notice of dishonor for non-payment if 
the item . . . is otherwise unavailable for re-
turn . . ." (Emphasis added). 
Valley Bank's reliance on the written requirement 
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of Section 4-301 is misplaced. Section 4-301 provides 
for the collection of items by payor banks. I t has no 
application to collecting banks except through Section 
4-212(2). Section 4-212(2) is merely an election that 
may be exercised to return an unpaid item directly to 
the depository bank and is utilized to avoid the unneces-
sary handling by intermediary banks. Comment 4 of the 
Official Comments notes the purpose of the election 
provided by Section 4-212(2): 
4. "Subsection (2) is an affirmative provision 
for so-called "direct returns." This is a new 
practice that is currently in the process of de-
veloping in a few sections of the country. I ts 
purpose is to speed up the return of unpaid 
items by avoiding handling by one or more in-
termediate banks. The subsection is bracketed 
because the practice is not yet well established 
and some bankers and bank lawyers would 
prefer to let the practice develop by agreement. 
The contention is made that substantive rights 
between banks may be affected, e.g. available 
set of f s, but proponents contend advantages of 
direct returns outweigh possible detriments. 
However, if the subsection were omitted, the 
election to use direct returns would be on the 
depository bank and it would probably be 
necessary for that bank to specifically author-
ize direct returns with each outgoing letter." 
(Emphasis Added). 
I t is clear in this case that there was no attempt to 
return the dishonored check directly to the depository 
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bank (Valley Bank). Consequently, there was no exer-
cise of the election. Section 4-212 is, therefore, not ap-
plicable to this case and cannot be used to create a duty 
imposed on payor banks to send written notice of dis-
honor in direct returns. The provisions applicable to 
collecting banks make it clear that written or oral notice 
is sufficient notice of dishonor. See Sections 70A-4-202, 
70A-3-508, 70A-4-212. 
Valley Bank has further argued that the Code con-
templates written notice of dishonor through the Code's 
definition of "send" found in Section 70A-1-201(38). 
However, the preface of Section 201 provides that those 
definitions are: 
"subject to additional definitions contained in 
the subsequent chapters of this act which are 
applicable to specific chapters or parts there-
of." 
Further, that section specifically notes that the defini-
tions "are applicable unless the context otherwise re-
quires." 
In this case, the specific Article IV sections, as well 
as the context of those provisions, make it clear that oral 
notice of dishonor may be sent. When written notice is 
necessary, the Code expressly provides. Section 4-301 (1) 
(b) describes when a payor bank "sends written notice of 
dishonor," while Section 4-210(1) indicates when a col-
lecting bank must send "written notice that the bank 
holds the item for acceptance or payment." However, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
in all other situations, oral notice is sufficient. Section 
4-212 provides that a collecting bank may "charge back" 
if it, among other things, "sends notification of the 
facts." Similarly, Section 4-301(2) and Section 4-302 
refer to situations where the payor bank "sends notice 
of dishonor." Section 4-503 discusses when a bank must 
"notify its transferor of the dishonor." 
Valley Bank urges this court to imply written 
notice where the Code has failed to do so. Article I V 
of the Code has indicated in which specific circumstances 
written notice is required. I t is a well-recognized prin-
cipal of statutory construction that the use of specific 
words connotes an intent to exclude that which is not 
specifically mentioned. Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. 
v. Public Service Commimon, 21 Utah 2d 377, 455 P.2d 
990 (1968); Hansen v. Board of Education, 101 Utah 
15, 116 P.2d 936 (1941). Since the Code in this case 
has indicated when written notice is required, the ab-
sence of any requirement for written notice in other sit-
uations must be considered as an indication that the 
Code draftsmen and the Utah Legislature did not in-
tend to require written notice in those situations. 
Even if the Code did require written notice, the 
Code recognizes that such requirements may be modi-
fied by agreement. Section 70A-4-103(l) provides: 
" (1) The effect of the provisions of this chap-
ter may be varied by agreement except that 
no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsi-
bility for its own lack of good faith or failure 
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to exercise ordinary care or can limit the 
measure of damages for such lack of failure; 
but the parties may by agreement determine 
the standards by which such responsibility is 
to be measured if such standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable." 
Section 4-103 makes it clear that even if written 
notice were required in the Code, the parties by agree-
ment could establish a contrary practice or custom if not 
manifestly unreasonable. In the present case, it is the 
custom or practice of the banking community to give 
oral notice of dishonor on items over $1,000.00. (R. 17) 
I t must be emphasized that Valley Bank has not re-
quired or even requested a deviation from that policy, 
either before the initiation of this lawsuit or subsequent 
to it. That practice must, therefore, constitute tacit 
agreement by Valley Bank that oral notification is suf-
ficient. 
CONCLUSION 
The Code has clearly and expressly indicated that 
oral notice is sufficient "notification of dishonor" for 
collecting banks. I t has further indicated those specific 
circumstances when written notice is required. First 
Security received its notice of dishonor on September 
8, 1970. Pursuant to the standards of reasonable care 
and the statutory authority conferred by Section 
70A-3-508, First Security gave oral notice of dishonor 
to Valley Bank on September 9, 1970. Valley Bank 
received this notice and, consequently, First Security 
had the right to charge back the provisional credit given 
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Valley Bank. The trial court properly ruled on the basis 
of substantial evidence that First Security had the right 
to make such a charge back, and that determination 
should be upheld. Respondent, therefore, requests that 
this court affirm the lower court's judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By ^^==^..^J^^ 
Don B.Allen 
ames W. Gilson 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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